The Pedagogical Unconscious: Rethinking Marxist Pedagogy through Louis Althusser and Fredric Jameson

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Abstract

What is the major crisis facing Marxism today? Famously, the French Marxist Louis Althusser wrote that the problem in Marxism is philosophical. There is for him a necessary lag time between the emergence of historical materialism as a science and dialectical materialism as the philosophy of Marxist categories, thus allowing bourgeois concepts to eat at Marxism from the inside out. As opposed to this position, Fredric Jameson has labeled the Marxist crisis as one of ideology. Here the solution is not philosophical but rather aesthetic in so far as all ideologies necessarily contain within them an aesthetic dimension that functions as a utopian (and thus affective) lure and as a representational narrative structure enabling the subject to represent his or her relation to the mode of production. In this paper, I will argue that beneath these separate problematics, both authors are actually concerned with a more fundamental but largely repressed problem: Marxist pedagogy. In Althusser, this becomes clear in various essays including his preface to Capital Volume One as well as in Reading Marx (which is a pedagogical exercise par excellence). In Jameson, the pedagogical dimension of his ideological problematic derives from his analysis of cognitive mapping. This symptomatic reading if I can prematurely borrow from Althusser's vocabulary does not collapse the two authors into a moment abstracted from historical context wherein we can judge which crisis is more "authentic." Surely Althusser's project was conditioned by his relation to the French Communist Party in the nineteen sixties, and similarly Jameson's cultural turn was a response to the postmodern condition of late capitalism. What I am suggesting is that within both there arises (sometimes explicitly but more often than not implicitly and
on the margins) the persistent question of pedagogy as it relates to and underlies both Marxist philosophy and Marxist aesthetics. Pedagogy thus is not a "general theory" that clarifies various "regional theories" (see Althusser, 2003) but rather a general practice, which articulates regional practices (e.g. imaginative dreaming and philosophical conceptualization) in its very form.

For Althusser: Science, Philosophy, Pedagogy

In "The Historical Task of Marxist Philosophy," Althusser outlines a principle thesis that in many ways underlines the vast majority of his work. Quoting Althusser, "Marxist philosophy today represents the 'decisive link' on which depend the future of Marxist theory and, consequently, the 'correctness' or the union of Marxist theory and the workers' movement" (2003, p. 169). In other words, the fate of Marxism as a historical force lives or dies, for Althusser, by philosophy. Yet, Marxist philosophy is underdeveloped and, even worse, underrepresented in Marxist scholarship. Thus if Marxist philosophy is the decisive link, it is precisely because, to use Lenin's terminology, it is the weakest link in Marxist theory and practice.

For Marx, Althusser thus attempts to rehabilitate Marxist philosophy in two ways: a) counteract the (still) prevalent emphasis on Marx's early humanism and b) develop Marxist categories and concepts out of a militant critique of the residual effects of Hegelian dialectics. At stake here is rigorously determining those moments in Marxism that move beyond Hegel and humanist philosophy and gesture towards an as of yet still to be formalized Marxist philosophy that not only inverts Hegel but more properly subverts him entirely. The urgency of this project is not simply academic. As stated above, the revolution hinges on the proper understanding of Marxist philosophy. Defending himself against possible accusations of idealism, Althusser writes,

The union of theory and practice implies that every political practice contains a philosophy, while every philosophy contains a practical signification, a politics. That is why it is essential, under certain circumstances, to go all the way back to philosophical principles in order to combat the ideological distortions of political practice, and why under these circumstances not only for the Marxist science of
According to Althusser, without proper philosophical development, the worker's party would not in the end develop into a revolutionary movement, resulting in reformism.

With this task in mind, Althusser sets to work. The first order of business is to get Marxist philosophy (dialectical materialism) caught up with Marxist science (historical materialism). This lag is not simply a historical contingency, nor is it unique to Marxism alone. Rather, Althusser makes this lag between science and philosophy a law of history, pointing out similarities between the rise of Greek geometry and the belated philosophy of Plato. Likewise, Galileo's physics could only be followed at a later date by the enlightenment philosophies of Descartes, etc. As for Marxism, Marx founded a new science (the science of history whose objects include class struggle and the mode of production) yet left us few sources with which to construct a Marxist philosophy. From this lag, a second problem arises. Because philosophy is always belated, pre-existing ideologies come to fill in the vacuum opened by the discovery of a new object of inquiry, leading to confusions rather than clarifications of the object. These ideologies (in particular theoretical humanism, empiricism, and evolutionism) thus come to masquerade as philosophy. Eventually the importation of external concepts reaches a crisis in explanation, revealing their own ideological dimension. It is here that the need for a truly Marxist philosophy becomes apparent in order to think through the concepts underlying historical materialism.

The concepts that Althusser is most concerned with are a) causality and b) the dialectic, both of which are in desperate need of liberation from pre-existing, external philosophies. Without the systematization of these concepts, the political ramifications could be disastrous. But is the time right to adequately address this issue? For Althusser, the answer is yes. A new philosophical conjunction between psychoanalysis, Marxism, and linguistics has created the theoretical preconditions for an elucidation of dialectical materialism, which had remained inexplicable and thus underdeveloped in Marxist thought. While humanism, evolutionism, and empiricism submerged the categories of causality and dialectic in a reactionary ideology of the bourgeoisie, linguistics and psychoanalysis (especially the psychoanalysis of Jacques
Lacan) help to elucidate the mode of production, infrastructure, superstructure, and class struggle in relation to new philosophical notions of causality and dialectics.

Replacing bourgeois concepts with rigorous Marxist categories, Althusser introduces "structural causality" and "overdetermination," both of which draw on psychoanalysis and linguistics to create a theoretical language adequate to a Marxist philosophy. In this case, reactionary concepts lurking within the Marxist system are exchanged for a more dynamic model through which multiple factors dispersed throughout society, economics, and politics all differentially relate to one another within a structural totality, leading to a complex confluence of forces that "overdetermine" any one particular action/moment in the workers’ struggle. Of course the economy is determinant in the last instance. Stated differently, whatever (superstructural) factor is determinant at any one given moment in history is itself determined by the economy in the last instance. With this move, Althusser is able to begin to guide us towards a Marxist philosophy that adequately articulates the system of theoretical practices and the system of social practices forming the complex ensemble that is the historical conjuncture. Without developing dialectical materialism, then the workers’ struggle would remain unable to pinpoint "the dominant form of displacement" versus "the dominant form of condensation" within the overdetermined totality of social relations (Althusser, 1969, p. 216).

While this brief outline details Althusser's conscious project, there is another less conscious but all the more important project within Althusser's writings: a sustained concern for Marxist pedagogy. This project comes to the foreground in Althusser's introduction to *Capital: Volume One*. Here he picks up on a problematic set out by Marx but never adequately resolved.

In the preface to the French edition of *Capital: Volume One* (1872), Marx himself posed the question of pedagogy. To the French citizens he wrote, "I applaud your idea of publishing the translation of *Capital* as a serial. In this form the book will be more accessible to the working class, a consideration which to me outweighs everything else" (1990, p. 104). Here Marx enthusiastically endorses the French translators' attempt to answer the question of presentation, a question that is assuredly pedagogical in origin. Yet Marx is also hesitant, and in the following paragraph he demonstrates more reserve.
The method of analysis which I have employed, and which had not previously been applied to economic subjects, makes the reading of the first chapters rather arduous, and it is to be feared that the French public, always impatient to come to a conclusion, eager to know the connection between the general principles and the immediate questions that have aroused their passions, may be disheartened because they will be unable to move on at once (Ibid).

Thus Marx reaches a pedagogical standstill. He emphatically emphasizes the need for raising the class-consciousness of the workers, yet at the same time recognizes the difficulties of teaching his own text to the masses. In an overtly Hegelian moment, Marx concludes that the only solution is to teach the workers "not to dread the fatiguing climb" towards the "luminous summits" of the dialectic (Ibid). As such, the difficult labor of the concept is largely left to the intellectual labor of the workers themselves as part of the historical struggle to attain class-consciousness. Such a "solution" returns Marx to Hegel, whose labor of the negative remained placed on the shoulders of the bourgeois individual.

Althusser has a different, more pedagogical solution to this problem. He begins his preface with the question of reading itself. How do we read Marx's writings, and more importantly, how do we teach them? Two difficulties immediately arise when one poses these questions: first, a political difficulty and second, a theoretical difficulty. *Capital* is difficult to read because of the class position of the reader (worker versus capitalist and the different interests therein). Furthermore, there is the question of the familiarity of the audience to theoretical treatises such as *Capital*. If the audience is inclined towards theoretical work, then the text, according to Althusser, should be a relatively easy read, but for those who are unfamiliar with theory, then the text might be more challenging. Addressing the later audience (which would have no doubt included many of the workers Althusser was most concern with), Althusser gives opening pointers concerning the language and objective of theory (including the definition of concepts, the formulation of systematic thought, and the utilization of abstract objects).

Althusser locates the major problem of pedagogy (as Marx himself suggested) with the opening chapters of *Capital*. Unlike Marx who argued that the reader must struggle through these sections on his or her own, Althusser suggests another solution to reading: bypass these chapters. This bypass is not only pedagogical, but also part of
Althusser's philosophical project, which attempts to eliminate the Hegelian aspects of Marxism as residual effects of bourgeois ideology. The first chapters of Marx's masterpiece (those in particular dealing with the commodity form, exchange-value, and fetishization) are difficult not simply because they are the most abstract but more properly because they are the most pedagogically suspect. As such Hegel's influence on Marx leads to two interrelated problems: first the question of philosophical formulation and second the question of reading and thus of learning Marxism. In Althusser's work these two problems are always already linked. In other words, the question of pedagogy is not external to Althusser's philosophical project. While philosophy represents class struggle in the form of theory, pedagogy, as we shall see below, enacts class struggle on the level of learning itself, transforming what it means to both interact with and produce new knowledge.

To read *Capital*, one must adopt a new educational practice, *a la* Lenin. Lenin's reading of Marx was informed by a proper philosophical orientation and thus resisted Hegelian notions of dialectics. For Hegel, dialectical reading (a form of learning predicated on bourgeois ideology imitating philosophy) rests on the concept of inversion. Yet Lenin does not simply adopt this metaphor as a methodology of learning. Rather he makes a radical cut with Hegel and invents a new dialectically materialist reading strategy. "Laying bare," as Althusser argues, is a method of learning that is uniquely Marxist in origin (2001, p. 76). It is a way of conceptualizing knowledge adequate to historical materialism as a science informed by the rigorous notions of structural causality and overdetermination. Its two major features include:

The rejection of a mass of propositions and theses with which nothing can be done, from which absolutely nothing can be obtained, skins without kernels; the retention of certain well-chosen fruits and vegetables, and their careful peeling or the disentanglement of their kernels from their thick skins, tangled with the kernel, by real transforming work (Ibid, p. 77).

In short, to be a student of dialectical materialism, one cannot simply employ bourgeois forms of reading in inverted form. Rather we must learn to learn differently, or read differently, in a manner that is dialectically materialist from the outset. Here theory is not simply added onto practice but rather the practice of learning itself becomes the theory of historical materialism.
Bearing the relationship between philosophy and pedagogy in mind, Althusser's book *Reading Capital*, co-written by Etienne Balibar, is nothing less than an elaborate pedagogical device for facilitating entry into Marx's text, and a fully envisioned form of educative practice that is distinctly Marxist. In other words, the book demonstrates its own relation to its object of study, and as such is a pedagogical exercise. In fact, I would argue that it is perhaps the most elaborate pedagogical tool devised from within Marxism to address questions of pedagogy (except perhaps Paulo Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*). *Reading Capital* begins with a quintessential pedagogical move: we must all become students of Marxism by reading *Capital" to the letter," meaning read the text multiple times, in various translations, without influence of secondary sources coloring our readings (1970, p. 13). What follows is in essence a diary of such a program, the starting point for a reading, and, most importantly, a pedagogical method for philosophical reading as such. The central question of the text revolves around the issue "what is it to read?" (Ibid, p. 15). Here reading cannot be reduced to the mere cognitive acquisition of the various complexities of *Capital*. More properly, "to read" means to read via Marx's own strategy of reading. This question of Marxist literacy, and also necessarily how to teach others to read, is for Althusser key to cultivating revolutionary consciousness. As Althusser writes,

> our age threatens one day to appear in the history of human culture as marked by the most dramatic and difficult trial of all, the discovery of and training in the meaning of the 'simplest' acts of existence: seeing, listening, speaking, reading the acts which relate men to their works, and to those works thrown in their own faces, their 'absence of the works' (17)

... If pedagogy is not simply the relay of information but rather the facilitation of the proper relationship to (revolutionary) knowledge, then in this quotation Althusser suggests Marxism must take purchase not simply in the synthesis of information but in the very cognitive senses through which our education takes place: through reading, writing, and perhaps even arithmetic. Here Althusser's introductory essay speaks to the need to examine not simply what *Capital* itself says but how we interact with this text in order to learn from this interaction how to learn.

By turning *Capital* into a textbook on revolutionary literacy, Althusser presents to us a new pedagogy, which facilitates the reading of what is unsaid in being said within the fabric of the text. By exposing the unsaid in the said, he is able to demonstrate
how Marx himself introduced a new theoretical problematic into political economy from the inside out. Althusser comes to this conclusion by carefully analyzing and reconstructing the figure of Marx as an assiduous student of political economy. What is revealed in this elaboration is not simply a new form of literacy, but rather a practice constituting a new notion of vision itself and a new mode of being a student. Using Marx as a model, Althusser suggests that the student should not simply read for content but rather produce a new problematic by reading the unconscious of the text. In other words, the object that is present in its very absence, the internally excluded object or question must be revealed in order to transform the entire field of knowledge itself. Borrowing from Freud, Althusser argues that this new Marxist form of vision is the technology necessary to perform a "symptomatic reading" that exposes what is hidden in clear view within a text, including within Capital itself.

Along with laying bare, symptomatic reading is therefore a philosophical method that Althusser applies to Marx, and which we the readers are compelled to apply to Althusser. The problem then becomes: What is the question Althusser unwittingly poses in his text but which remains unconscious throughout? The answer can now be stated in its most definitive form: the question of Marxist pedagogy. As I have been arguing, Althusser's intervention is most accurately positioned within the field of Marxist education, and yet this intervention only arises as a symptom within his stated project of supplying Marxism with a viable philosophy. In its strongest formulation, the moment of pedagogy arrives exactly at the point of philosophical productivity hence Althusser's need to present his humanist controversy in terms of a pedagogical solution to Marx's own teacherly dilemma. And, inversely, it is only through the philosophical question of early versus late Marx that the gesture towards a theory of pedagogical enactment is broached. What I am suggesting is that in Althusser, philosophy is not a set of ideas but an activity, the articulation of class struggle in the realm of theory, and that pedagogy is the practice of laying bare this method, of demonstrating its principles so as to reconstitute the very definition of what it means to learn and in turn produce knowledge.

In sum, I propose that if there is truly a lag between the advent of a science and of its philosophy, then perhaps there is another lag that Althusser unconsciously recognized but only appears symptomatically in the margins of his writings: the lag between
philosophy and pedagogy. Just because pedagogy is a question internal to Althusser's philosophical work does not mean that pedagogical issues are resolved by philosophical solutions. Rather when pedagogy becomes an issue in and for itself within Althusser's theory, a new problematic emerges that has serious consequences for Marxist philosophy. As such, it is Marxist pedagogy, not Marxist philosophy that now presents itself as a pressing concern. We must now ask: How have bourgeois concepts infiltrated Marxist pedagogical practices involving teaching and learning? What is the theoretical conjuncture that will be most useful in waging class struggle not in terms of educational content so much as the very structures of revolutionary education? These questions ask us to think through a Marxist pedagogy that is revolutionary not simply in its substance but in its very form as substance, in its very enactment. Whether or not we accept his final conclusions concerning either Marxism (i.e. the infamous humanist controversy concerning the break between early and late Marx) or if you accept his pedagogical advice (i.e. the presentation of Capital or his particular mode of reading), we must grant that at least Althusser's writings gesture towards a second lag that cannot be easily ignored. As I will suggest below, the emergent crisis in teaching and in learning Marxism cannot be addressed by Althusser's philosophy alone and necessitates a turn towards aesthetics.

**Jameson's Pedagogical Aesthetic**

Drawing on a wide spectrum of Marxist literary theory, Fredric Jameson summarizes his own political problematic with the following clarion call: "We have to name the system" (1995, p. 418). Here his emphatic inflection is placed on the verb "to name" as an act of representing the totality of social relations with their multiple, internal contradictions. Yet, the very possibility of naming the system is in a state of crisis not because of the inadequacies of Marx's historical materialism which have if anything proven their viability in a global age of transnational exploitation, ecological destruction, and poverty but rather because of the state of representation itself. The cultural logic of late capitalism, postmodernism, has made it increasingly difficult to represent totality, culminating in a disorienting effect and political uncertainty. Thus globalization in all its immensity and sublimity becomes an impossible object whose attending cultural logic revels in fragmentation and localization. "As I have said before," writes Jameson, "the so-called crisis in Marxism is not a crisis in Marxist
science, which has never been richer, but rather a crisis in Marxist ideology" (1988). As opposed to Althusser's insistence on defining a Marxist philosophy (which is nevertheless important and necessary, especially given Althusser's precarious position both as a Communist Party member and philosophy professor), Jameson contends that Marxism in the postmodern era of global capitalism demands an aesthetic or cultural turn, a turn towards "cognitive mapping."

Based on Kevin Lynch's work, the cognitive map for Jameson charts relations not simply in the city but in the "global village" of late capitalism, revealing the underlying circuits that create a transnational economic system in an innovative and comprehensive narrative structure. Such a map represents the contradictions within capitalism through aesthetic forms that do not ideologically resolve the contradictions but rather present them in relation to the mode of production as an absent yet omnipresent determinant. Jameson's mapping strategy is in sum dynamic (in which the very narrative of the map contains a necessary temporal dimension), exploring the constantly shifting relation between the positive and negative movements of society as a whole. In other words, cognitive mapping decisively counteracts the ludic tendencies in postmodernism by articulating heterogeneity into a mediated totality.

Expanding on Jameson's argument, we could argue that more generally, the crisis in Marxism is pedagogical, i.e. how to teach the cognitive abilities needed to represent capitalism? In fact, Jameson has argued that cognitive mapping includes a necessary pedagogical dimension.

An aesthetic of cognitive mapping a pedagogical political culture which seeks to endow the individual subject with some new heightened sense of its place in the global system will necessarily have to respect this now enormously complex representation dialectic and invent radically new forms in order to do it justice (Jameson 1995, p. 54).

Cognitive mapping is pedagogical precisely because it concerns itself with the dual function of naming the system and the cultivation of the cognitive abilities necessary to map in the first place. In terms of the former, Jameson indicates that the map must strive for totality (including the utopian moment poised at the very edge of the capitalist system), and in terms of the later, that it builds towards a new notion of learning and interacting with the world that is at its heart revolutionary. Whereas for
Althusser pedagogy concerned itself primarily with learning philosophical practices that are strictly conceptual, for Jameson, pedagogy is placed on an imaginary level wherein representation links the local subject to the universal level of class struggle via aesthetic not theoretical practices.

Thus, unlike Althusser, Jameson's concern for pedagogy is more overtly connected with aesthetic theory, for it is in aesthetics that Jameson discovers the tools necessary to jumpstart our collective imaginations to rethink historical time in terms of contradictions. In fact, his book entitled *Brecht and Method* (2000) is a book dedicated (in part) to the question of pedagogy in the arts and the art of pedagogy. What Jameson admires most in Brecht is his unwavering political project to "to move, to teach, and to delight" (Ibid, p. 3). The rest of the book is an intricate analysis of this tripartite project as it manifests itself in Brecht's many aesthetic endeavors, ranging from poetry to theatre. In other words, Jameson, through Brecht, exposes the intricate relationship between the problematic of aesthetics, enjoyment, representation, and pedagogy that emerges as the crux of Brechtian method and as a central lesson for the present moment. Brecht is thus rehabilitated for our current historical situation not because of some sort of homology between his notion of estrangement and the aesthetic effects of the postmodern but rather because of his usefulness in returning Marxist theory to the politics and possibilities of pedagogy.

To begin, Jameson describes Brecht as a pedagogue whose lesson is not so much didactic as it is methodological. Jameson writes, "There existed a Brechtian 'stance' which was not only doctrine, narrative, or style, but all three simultaneously; and ought better to be called, with all due precautions, 'method'" (2000, p. 132). Method in other words includes a form of cognition that is not strictly conceptual but rather sensual (involving the stance of the body as it is located in a specific situation) and imaginative (involving the creative moment of estrangement as well as the utopian moment of salvation). This emphasis on method is not, as Jameson is quick to point out, simply the "objectivity" of empiricism we witness in science let alone in contemporary educational standardization. Rather, Brecht's focus on method is always highly self-aware and resistant to reification. Brecht's method thus "unfolds itself, dramatically, into the very situation of pedagogy itself as it is variously staged, mocked, analyzed, prophesied and utopianly projected" (Jameson, 2000, p. 27).
Drama in other words contains referential content, but also and more importantly, Brecht's theatre is auto-referential in that it points to itself, presenting its own representational practice as a new mode for cognizing the world. Brecht's great contribution to Marxism, and in turn what makes him politically important today in postmodernism, is thus not that of his position (Marxist or otherwise), his concepts (which remain imprecise), or his philosophy (which lacks demonstrative systematicity and rigor, or is totally subsumed by theatrical enactment), but rather his insistence on pedagogy, on the problem of representing the very representational possibilities of contradiction and change within an aesthetic form. According to Jameson, "Teaching is thus showing, as has already been remarked; the dramatic representation of teaching is the showing of showing, the showing of how you show and demonstrate" (Ibid, p. 91). What is pedagogical in Brecht is his insistence on scrupulously examining the act of showing that is the artistic gesture. Stated differently, he is keenly aware of the need to demonstrate how to demonstrate, and thus to teach how to teach.

This centrality of education and of pedagogy is further illustrated in Brecht's rewriting of the classics. Jameson demonstrates that in Brecht's treatment of *Hamlet*, he intentionally shifts Hamlet's dilemma from one of psychological indecision to one of learning. Hamlet is reluctant to learn, and this is his great tragic failing. But what for Brecht is to be taught and in turn to be learned? Here didacticism is once again avoided and displaced by the emphatic resonance between education, contradiction, and the arrival of the new. In Jameson's reading, Brecht teaches the lesson of historical change through the very form of presentation. For instance, two central theatrical methods of Brechtian theatre separation and distance are not simply formal elements but rather become allegories for the division of the social into antagonistic classes (Jameson, 2000, p. 72). Thus Brecht does not simply write about class struggle in terms of thematic content. Rather, he finds a method for understanding how objective class relations condition an aesthetic form adequate to expressing social alienation: estrangement. Here, proper pedagogy is an act of representation that arranges subjects, objects, and situations in such a way as to make the dialectic appear through enactment. Such a pedagogical practice enables us to think dialectically by exposing oppositions as contradictions and in turn as possibilities for the arrival of the new or the *Novum*. In sum, Brechtian theatre is useful precisely as a provocation of new thought, as a pedagogy of the new.
Learning for Brecht, and also for Jameson, is thus linked to utopia on a profound level. Commenting on Brecht's dramaturgical curriculum Jameson writes, "what is taught, what is shown, is ultimately always the New itself, and thus somehow, modernity in its most general rather than specific and technological acceptation" (Jameson, 2000, p. 92). In other words, "Learning thus displays the breaking in of the Novum upon the self: a drawing both of a new world and of new human relations" (Ibid). As such, pedagogy cannot be the presentation of facts and figures, of predigested and thus standardized knowledge, but must present the new via an emphasis on change. Change takes center stage for Brecht through this insistence on multiple rehearsals where every variation in gesture is examined as well as in plays such as Der Jasager with its three alternative endings. Just as pedagogy must involve itself with change (and thus with the notion of history as an unfolding, dialectical process), so too must change seek out a pedagogy adequate for its revolution. Hence Brecht's turn towards Mao and the notion of a cultural "reeducation" in order to solidify the structure of the revolution in terms of personal habit and conscious beliefs. In sum, Brecht's pedagogy presents contradictions not ideas or ideologies. It presents movement and change as practices rather than as concepts.

As Althusser argued a truly Marxist method of education must expose new problematics within old texts, so too does Brecht's pedagogy encourage us to search for the new in the old and the old in what appears to be radically new. His treatment of the classics is not simply mocking, but rather pedagogical in the sense that each historical play teaches us what was true in the very untruth of its idealism. This pedagogical form that excavates the moment of the new in the past, is incorporated into Jameson's dual hermeneutic where the ideological also contains the kernel of the utopian, of the not-yet or the almost. Jameson reiterates this Brechtian formulation of education in his passing comments on Benjamin and Adorno. Regarding the influence of the former on the later, Jameson argues,

‘Influence’ in this new sense would then describe the ways in which the pedagogical figure, by his own praxis, shows the disciple what else you can think and how much further you can go with the thoughts you already have; or to put it another way, which for us is the same what else you can write and the possibility of forms of writing and Darstellung that unexpectedly free you from the taboos and constraints of forms learnt by rote and assumed to be inscribed in the nature of things (2000b, p. 52).
To teach, in other words, is not to present information but rather to present options, the possibility of new possibilities, the open nature of the future. Just as Brecht emphasized change and transformation, so too must pedagogy in general concern itself with the unsaid in the said, the problematic on the horizon of thought, the moment of rupture that pole-vaults us into the qualitative difference of the *Novum*. "Running abreast of change, catching up with it, espousing its tendencies in such a way as to begin to inflect its vectors in your own direction such is Brechtian pedagogy " (Ibid, p. 27). Change here is not contained in philosophy (no matter how shrewd) nor in his aesthetic style (no matter how distinctive), but rather in the form of showing, in his very showing how to show, in his pedagogy.

Jameson's emphasis on utopia, which runs throughout his writings, thus takes on a decisively pedagogical dimension for it is in utopian literature (from More to sci-fi) that the occupation of pedagogy reveals its most crystalline shape: to orient learning towards the new. In his many analyses of utopian texts, Jameson repeatedly argues that their lesson is not to be found in the specifics of thematic content so much as in their form as a praxis, as a pedagogical model. This form is an operation on the real of social relations that overtly points towards the unfinished nature of the present (Jameson, 1977). Although Jameson does not refer explicitly to utopia as a pedagogical form, his description of these texts as praxis symptomatically gestures towards the problem of pedagogy. Here the intimations of pedagogy are clearly though unconsciously conjured, for utopia is not simply representation (a stagnant blueprint) but is rather an activity that fosters the cognitive capacities to dream the new, or as Jameson later describes it "to desire to desire" the *Novum* (Jameson, 1994, p. 90). With this turn towards utopia as a central model within a revolutionary pedagogy, Jameson clearly marks out a specific territory distinct from Althusser's insistence on philosophy (as the rigorous work of defining concepts in opposition to bourgeois ideology). Here pedagogy intervenes on the level of the imaginary and thus on the level of affects and of the fantasy structuring the relation between the subject, historical change, class struggle, and hope for a radically different future.
Conclusion: Pedagogy as Hot and Cold

The Brazilian educator Paulo Freire once wrote,

> For me education is simultaneously an act of knowing, a political act, and an artistic event. I no longer speak about a political dimension of education. I no longer speak about a knowing dimension of education. As well, I don't speak about education through art. On the contrary, I say education is politics, art, and knowing (quoted in Giroux and McLaren, 1997, p. 138).

One reading of this passage would suggest that Freire was playing fast and loose with his categories, indiscriminately collapsing distinct disciplines into the moment of pedagogical enactment. But another reading could just as easily argue that Freire hit upon the unique position of pedagogy in relation to aesthetics and philosophy. The truth of Althusser and Jameson lies in their realization that pedagogy is a necessary question internal to philosophy and aesthetics. Yet pedagogy in both cases remains subsumed by each respective discipline. This means that for Althusser, pedagogy remains strictly analytical, and for Jameson, imaginary. Although both are united in their (often times unconscious) concerns for pedagogy, they nevertheless miss Freire's more expansive discussion of pedagogy *in and for itself*. Using Freire's comments as a springboard, we can now see how it is that pedagogy is a practice of presentation necessary to both philosophy and aesthetics as regional practices while superceding both. Because pedagogy arises from within each, it shares many of their (exclusive if not oppositional) characteristics in its own form. As a general practice, pedagogy becomes the presentation of philosophical practice within dramatic and narrative form. But without a notion of pedagogy as a general practice, then the resources for arriving at an adequate Marxist theory of education will remain reduced to solving regional problems with regional tools (philosophical or aesthetic). It is through a general pedagogical practice that philosophy must necessarily meet the aesthetic, producing a new problematic that is not reducible to either yet drawing resources from both. This problematic concerns the tensions and contradictions that arise when philosophical practices must be narrativized (transformed into allegories, proverbs, or plays) in order to be taught. Thus pedagogy does not collapse into philosophy (Althusser) or aesthetics (Jameson). Yet it is the internal, dynamic structure of the pedagogical moment that has yet to be fully explicated, and therefore is left open to be infiltrated by bourgeois pedagogical theory.
As such, pedagogy becomes a noted point for re-imagining the relation between cold and warm streams of Marxism (Bloch, 1996, p. 209). In the cold stream, philosophical, calculating, rational, and critical analysis is favored and encouraged. Althusser clearly falls within this camp. On the other side of the theoretical fence is the warm stream, which concerns itself with revolutionary zeal, liberating intention, and utopia. Jameson's turn towards cultural studies (granted a cultural studies reflected through the prism of Marxist categories such as the mode of production, contradiction, totality, etc.) articulates most decisively with Ernst Bloch's warm current. It is my contention that both of these moves have arisen from the objective possibilities of their respective historical moments, producing Marxism(s) that are adequate to the central concerns of the situation at hand. Yet beneath these permutations in Marxist thought these seasonal shifts within the problematic of Marxist thinking in general a more fundamental problematic remains: pedagogy as a general practice concerned with the system of Marxist education as a whole. As Freire reminds us, this operation of pedagogy on and within knowledge is a site of opportunities but also of new obstacles which Marxist theorists have yet to fully appreciate. It is my contention that in order to face the tyranny of global capitalism, the question of Marxist education is of paramount importance, and that such questions cannot be met simply by either by reorienting curriculum towards discussion of class struggle or by creating new aesthetics to imaginatively conceptualize social totality. The first misses the crucial problem of pedagogical form and the later misses the need to develop new philosophical categories/practices out of pedagogical showing and teaching. This essay has been an attempt to address this lacuna and as such to decrease the lag time between the arrival of a Marxist science and a Marxist education so as to strengthen the weakest link on the revolutionary front.

**Bibliography**


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Is it the Marxism of Marx or the diametrically opposed to each other Marxism of Althusser and Habermas? Perhaps we mean Marxism of Trotsky [1] or even that of V. Lenin. Most likely we mean Marxism in the spirit of E. Ilyenkov (Bakhurst, 1991, Jones, 2000; Jones, 2001). Such a contradictory picture indicates a lack of historical perspective in approaching the cultural-historical theory of Vygotsky. For Vygotsky the term “Marxist psychology” coincided with that of scientific psychology in general wherever and by whomsoever it might be developed (Vygotsky, 1982, p. 435). This might be the formula, probably the key formula, expressing Vygotsky’s understanding of what is Marxist psychology. Fredric Jameson (born April 14, 1934) is an American literary critic, philosopher, and Marxist political theorist. He is best known for his analysis of contemporary cultural trends, particularly his analysis of postmodernity and capitalism. Jameson’s best-known books include Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (1991) and The Political Unconscious (1981). Jameson marked his full-fledged commitment to Hegelian-Marxist philosophy with the publication of The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act, the opening slogan of which is “always historicize” (1981). The Political Unconscious takes as its object not the literary text itself, but rather the interpretive frameworks by which it is now constructed. In Rethinking Intellectual History. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1983. 234-267.