and with considerable insight. Their book would be particularly valuable for students of political philosophy. Curiously both authors operate out of a John Rawlsian perspective.

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This book has an ambitious goal: “[...] to offer an overview of the field [of political philosophy] and the depth of the issues” (2). The collection is aimed at postgraduate students, scholars and libraries, and includes a number of interesting companions: Philosophy of Mind (386 pp.), Philosophy of Science (475 pp.), Continental Philosophy (417 pp.), in addition to Companions to Aristotle (418 pp.), Kant (432 pp.), Hume (447 pp.), etc. Most are very useful and some even mandatory references. Unfortunately, this volume falls short of such an ambition. It certainly does not help that it is by far the shortest in the collection, at little more than 250 pages, considering the pervasive nature of the political problems it faces and the 2500 years during which political philosophy has occupied some of the world’s best minds.

The volume is composed of a set of fourteen essays, a small glossary (227-254), a brief chronology (223-225) and a suggestion of ‘research resources’ (255-258).

Contrary to expectations, the first essay, on the history of political philosophy, authored by James Alexander, is not an overview of the history of political philosophy, but a mere ten-page discussion of the respective roles of history and theory. The essay arrives at the commonsensical conclusion that “If philosophy without history is a desert, and history without philosophy is a jungle, then we certainly need something of both” (16); that is, in the end, the history of political philosophy “[...] is not political philosophy, but political philosophy is nothing without it” (30). The author, however, takes the rather shallow view that all political philosophy is but an “[...] attempt to respond to the world,” so we are not assured of its real perennial philosophical value, except maybe seeing it as predecessor to current political ideas. After serving old masters such as polis, or to empire, church or state, only “[...] in the twentieth century, there were attempts to define politics (or the category of ‘the political’) as something in itself” (19).

If the book begins with the past, the final essays go from contemporary theory to a prediction of future political philosophy. This is part of the design of the *Companion* series, where the last two essays are supposed to present a vision of the possible future of the subject matter. The last essays are quite original, at least in their basic ideas. Mathew Voorhees and J. Jeremy Wisnewski “[...] analyze the publication record of six leading journals” (200) over 20 years to offer the informed guess that we should expect more work on global politics (202), inclusion (203) and democratic theory (203-204), the continuing presence of ‘the Rawls industry’ (204), and some new applied ethical-political problems (gender studies, etc.). Eduardo Mendieta writes the final essay on some of these ‘trendy’ subjects.
Between the past and the future of political philosophy, the book includes a set of eleven short essays and a brief list of references on Sovereignty (33ff.), Cosmopolitanism (47ff.), Human rights (61), Distributive (75) and Restorative justice (95), War (109) and for the sake of symmetry, Peace (127), Toleration (139), Democratic theory (153), Feminism and gender (167), and Immigration (183). Notwithstanding, even a rough approach to such a goal is no small feat. The task obviously requires a set of competent scholars and great coordination. In this case, however, coordination as well as focus are clearly lacking. The work functions as a small encyclopaedia, whose entries may read in every conceivable order. In spite of the somewhat uneven character of the essays, ranging from excellent to banal, the book as a whole maintains a clear style and makes good reading. Many authors faced with a scarcity of space fall into the trap of resorting to what they have ‘argued elsewhere’ (20) and quote themselves very often. The list of references of each chapter is for that reason less than useful to the non-initiated.

Even taken as entries in an encyclopaedia, there are both problems with the scope of subjects and with the depth of the presentations. Considering the range of subjects, there are surprising absences, even considering an approach clearly centred on Western and mainstream Anglo-American analytical philosophy: there are no articles on ideal or non-ideal theory, utopianism, freedom, social contract, critical theory, Marxism, left and right libertarianism, property, etc. The questions related to Global Justice – the object of recent intense and lively debates – that are represented (cosmopolitanism, immigration, sovereignty and human rights) ignore important dimensions: environmental justice/climate change (barely mentioned under distributive justice), obligations to future generations, fairness in trade, and justice in finance. Depth is uneven: we must acknowledge that some chapters are more substantive than others.

If a common thread or setting is to be found throughout the book, it is democracy. Given the future (as predicted in the final essays) importance of democratic theory and its present challenges, the essay on the subject is among the weakest. The article on ‘democratic theory’ by Jacqelyn Ann K. Kegley is a reasonable and diverse overview of democratic studies, although it is partly crippled by a variety problems. Kegley starts by discussing equality and autonomy, the latter being composed of two conditions, competency and authenticity. While the former is defined as “[...] awareness of one’s desires and values” (154), the latter is mainly explored through a discussion of paternalism. The author then dwells on questions of democratic processes across two sections. In the first, she describes democratic processes; that is, the problem of having effective participation and what voting procedures should prevail, and relates this question to citizenship (types of citizenships, feminist criticisms to citizenship, and the virtues citizens should have). In the second section, Kegley addresses the question of deliberative democracy through Rawls and Habermas and its communitarian and, mainly, feminist and agonistic critics. The author then finishes with a section on justifications of democracy, mainly through a description of the Rawlsian social contract and instrumental defences of democracy (Habermas, Dewey, Sen, and Mill). Kegley offers a reasonable overview of some of the most important questions related to democracy in contemporary debate. Most refreshing are her references to feminist critiques, which are presented in a most fruitful and interesting light. This chapter is,
however, problematic on some aspects. First, its subject seems markedly vast compared to many other chapters, and, therefore, one feels that it could have deserved more pages. An instance of this problem becomes clear in the four further questions for research that are described in the beginning and then almost entirely restated at the end of the article, with very little added content in between. The article, it seems, tries to compress a mass of information into a small space. The idea of aggregative democracy is not directly addressed, although Schumpeter and, above all, Robert Dahl are explored. The relationship between liberalism and democracy is also touched at times, but never explicitly stated. The relationship in the first section between ‘equality and autonomy’ is also not completely explicit: Kegley focuses almost entirely on autonomy, and thus its relationship with equality is not clearly stated. In brief, this article partially reaches its objective of offering an overview of the debates surrounding democracy, but it would have benefited if it had been granted the space it deserved.

If the editor’s goal is ambitious, the reviewer’s task is almost impossible within the reasonable limits of a critical note, so we will focus on two of the best texts in the book: Sovereignty (chapter 2) and Liberal Toleration (chapter 9), in reverse order.

Robert Paul Churchill’s chapter on liberal toleration is an invaluable contribution: coherent, systematized, clear, enlightening, and a very good overview of the subject. Central to Churchill’s argument is his initial definition of tolerance at an individual level: “[...] the disposition to forebear from interfering with or using coercion to prevent the expression of beliefs, views, behaviors, or practices one considers seriously objectionable” (139). Churchill then develops the idea that such a view entails two necessary components: it requires a nontrivial objection from the tolerant individual (‘objection’ component) and a component that ‘trumps’ the objection in the name of a higher-order reason (‘forbearance’ component). Because toleration presupposes a realm of the intolerable, a third and sufficient condition is the creation of boundaries (‘rejection’ condition). This definition, says Churchill, reduces much of the ambiguities accompanying the uses of ‘tolerance’. After refuting what he sees as three “so-called paradoxes of toleration,” the author then turns to liberal neutrality, that is, “[...] the requirement that the liberal state must be neutral between competing conceptions of the good” (143). Churchill argues, therefore, that a liberal and neutral state is tolerant in a secondary sense: citizens agree to some public arrangements limiting the power of the state, and – consequently – individual toleration is practiced. Toleration as a general norm for democratic citizens, he continues, is much more implicit than explicit. Churchill relates this implicit form of toleration to Almond and Verba’s civic virtues and points out two of its features: tolerance is required “[...] to accept functioning democratic procedures, but also as a form of public interaction in a liberal democracy” (144). Afterwards, dwelling on the justifications for toleration, he goes back to history and describes Montaigne and Bayle’s brand of epistemic scepticism, as well as Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration and Mill’s On Liberty arguments. The justification of liberal toleration in contemporary political philosophy, Churchill observes, seems problematic because of the lack of non-circular or nontrivial ways of justifying it. The author then concludes his article with some further issues, such as understanding whether toleration is strictly formal or ‘the
chicken and the egg’ issue concerning toleration, that is, if toleration is necessary for a liberal democracy or the other way round. Churchill’s article is thorough and crystal-clear: it manages to provide much information in a limited space, and all without ambiguities of any sort. The overview on the subject of liberal toleration is both concise and complete. There is no doubt that the article’s apparent strengths owe much to Churchill’s initial definition of toleration. However, some of its weaknesses might lie there as well. He begins from the assumption that “[...] toleration is indispensable for liberal democracy,” both as a public attitude disposition claiming Rawls’ inheritance (more about private dispositions below), and “the accepted principle” (also Rawssian) that “a liberal state must be neutral between competing conceptions of the human good” (139), even if seriously objectionable (as in his example, same-sex marriage is objectionable on religious grounds). Real toleration is not merely enduring ‘grudgingly’ (140) or putting up with something one thinks is wrong, or going along, because this would make them ‘suspect’ for interfering with or trying to prevent such ‘evils’, if given the chance. Live and let live is not ‘sincere’ enough and prone to Plato’s criticism of democracy.

Even the ‘rejection condition’ (we assume it would apply to slavery, anti-Semitism, or cannibalism) is not ‘static’. If we accept these assumptions, the so-called paradoxes of toleration that plagued political philosophy can be easily dismissed as ‘fatuous’ (141) in less than two pages. Nut this is a big ‘if’: most liberals, including Rawls, would acknowledge that a ‘thin’ conception of the good is basic to a liberal state, namely the priority of basic freedoms. To require from every single citizen “private dispositions” that make him or her believe and act upon such belief that “[...] abortion, gambling, meat eating, pornography, handgun ownership” (141) are not merely something we sometimes have to put up with but sincerely tolerate – that is, support in name of a higher ranking moral principle – appears at first glance as not only not being indispensable but also as preventing inclusion in liberal democracy of most citizens, who view some or all these moral issues as very important. Churchill also claims that it is almost impossible that a ‘racist’ (and a fortiori a Nazi) is a reasonable person because he or she holds grudges against characteristics over which people cannot control (such as ethnicity or sexual orientation – that apparently evolves from being a sin to a disease, and then a choice, to become fate beyond people’s control). Isaiah Berlin, an unsuspected liberal, certainly did not dismiss Nazis as ‘irrational’. This solution to the paradox may not be vulnerable to Plato’s description of democracy, but it certainly seems to point to a Platonist institution, presented in his Laws, to deal with ‘good-faith’ atheists. There they should be compelled to read Montaigne and Bayle, because the hidden assumption appears to be that the scepticism fosters toleration. Moreover, some political naïveté appears to show here: even in a democratic country, one cannot or should not assume that everyone is a well-bred, liberal gentleman, ready to grant others the same rights in a quasi-Kantian mood. The cynical case against justice is also to be taken seriously: in fact, the question of tolerance is not merely an intellectual question, but often a matter of life and death. The article would certainly be deeper if the important question at stake were not addressed on the basis of assumptions about state neutrality that are merely justified very briefly in the end, but not addressed in any other chapters of the book.
Andrew Fiala’s chapter on sovereignty gives a decent overview of sovereignty from the point of view of political philosophy and leaves us with some nuances and further questioning. His article is divided into two parts: a brief history of the conceptual debate around sovereignty from Plato and the Bible until our times; and sovereignty in a contemporary context. In the first part of the article, Fiala observes that Plato and Bodin believed that sovereignty had a transcendental justification, embodied in a king. He then opposes this view to Hobbes and Locke’s idea that the power of the sovereign finds its source in an immanent original contract. He further describes how discussions on sovereignty went in two different directions when emphasizing the idea of a supreme authority: either toward centralization with the modern state or away from central power in liberal democratic theory. He then dwells on how liberal democratic theory questions sovereignty and ideas related to it and, at the extreme, falls within the anarchist tradition. This calling into question took the (more mainstream) form of natural law, human rights, and civil disobedience as forms to limit government power. It went as far as to materialize in a central feature of modern liberal-democratic regimes, justifying humanitarian interventions across borders: the idea that the individual has a sovereignty that states ought not to violate. In the second part, Fiala shows that the classic Westphalian sovereignty is not as neat as it was: although there are sovereign states and this sovereignty is consecrated in the UN Charter, normative criticisms contest this sovereignty from the point of view of natural law, cosmopolitanism, and obligations of the state toward the individual. In descriptive terms, sovereignty is challenged by phenomena such as immigration, multiculturalism, or cosmopolitanism. Overall, we are “[...)] left with sovereignty as a muddy and vague concept” (40), although it continues to be employed. Fiala then finishes this second part by showing some methodological issues concerning sovereignty that remain unsolved, namely, that Austin, Hart, and Hayek’s discussion of law, although interesting, leaves no answer to sovereignty from a normative perspective. In the end, he does quite a good job of showing the development of the concept and its place in political theory, especially from a current legal theory perspective.

There is a general remark to make about Fiala’s article. Although one has a good overview of sovereignty, one has more information, and one is left with some interesting questions, the article leaves the reader with a sense of a lack of unity. In other words, there seem to be many separated ideas and they seem to be following some logic, but it is not clear which. Maybe this overarching point can be located at the beginning of the first part of the article, when Fiala argues that “[...] the debate about sovereignty reflects a conflict between a Platonic (and later Christian) view of political authority as grounded in a moral and metaphysical hierarchy, on the one hand, and the modern liberal, democratic idea of citizen or individual sovereignty, on the other hand” (34). Beginning from Plato (!), who clearly ignored the concept, and Bodin, who is among its creators, dwelling on Hobbes and Locke’s vision in a couple pages is a necessity because the initial chapter on the history of political philosophy in fact almost completely ignores all these philosophers. In light of this distinction, the article then transits from divided ideas to a much more coherent whole: Fiala seems to go back and forth with this seminal distinction between ‘imposing authority’ versus ‘ contesting individuals’ in mind.
This is also why there are recurrent and very interesting references to the ‘extreme’ of the ‘contesting’ pole: the anarchists and the absolute sovereignty of the individual. Even if this distinction inevitably leads to simplifications, it is a very enlightening one, and it does help one to have a good general view of sovereignty. That said, however, the importance of this distinction could nonetheless be more explicit. Moreover, some additional minor remarks deserve to be addressed. For instance, and although there was indeed very little space to do so, a greater reference to Rousseau next to Hobbes and Locke could have been a good complement. The reference to Derrida and Agamben seems interesting, but is not sufficiently developed and – therefore – seems somewhat disconnected from the line of thinking. The shortcoming is that the author does not have the space to pave the way to the recent debate between cosmopolitans and its discontents, which is left to Gillian Brock’s chapter. This later chapter gives the reader a sketch of cosmopolitanism and the open questions on the subject, but barely mentions the substantive debates on the cosmopolitanism project that pervade recent literature (and politics in real life).

The same attempt to merge history of political philosophy with political philosophy is even more clear in Ovadia Ezra’s chapter, which begins with the Aristotelian theory of distributive justice and then jumps with almost no transition to recent thinking about distributive justice that covers Rawls, Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, Amartya Sen and others (we could question, however, Pogges’s importance in this lineage). Differences between Aristotle’s concern and modern concerns are overlooked. In some other chapters, some mandatory references are clearly missing. For example, George R. Lucas, Jr., presenting the difference between *ius ad bellum* and *ius in bello*, mentions Michael Walzer but ignores other very important contemporary thinkers such as Jeff McMahan (and maybe Francis Kamm).

In the end, the book is as good (and weak) as is to be expected from this kind of endeavour, but this is not a volume for ‘postgraduate students and scholars’, as promised. The essays appear instead addressed to undergraduates or the curious who need to come to terms with political philosophy and look for a reliable guide. In spite of any shortcomings, the book does include a number of good chapters and is generally readable. So maybe, in the end, “the Work shall not be wholly lost: For it will, as he believ’d, appear once more, In a new & more perfect Edition, Corrected and Amended By the Author.”

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*The Biological Foundations of Bioethics* is one of the three books Cambridge-based philosopher of science Tim Lewens published in 2015. It establishes a much-needed connection between bioethics and philosophy of biology along a variety of topics. This


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